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JUSTIFYING SEARCHES ON THE BASIS
OF EQUALITY OF TREATMENT
ROBERT L. MISNER
I. INTRODUCTION
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is in serious disarray. In
searches associated with specific criminal conduct, the per se rule of
Johnson v. United States I has been under siege almost since its incep-
tion. In searches associated with non-specific criminal conduct -
airport stops, 2 border searches,3 drug testing,4 and sobriety check-
points5 - the Supreme Court has been reluctant to restrict police
practices.6 Yet, it has become very difficult to predict just how the
dual objectives of the Fourth Amendment - protection against un-
justified searches and protection against arbitrary searches 7 - will
play out in any given set of facts.
There is, however, a rather surprising theme which seems to
unify many of the Supreme Court decisions on the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Supreme Court has become so concerned with the equal
treatment of searched persons that the Court has often abandoned
its role in providing protection for individual privacy. In many situ-
ations, the Supreme Court has become more interested in whether
all searched persons are treated equally than whether the Fourth
Amendment has protected persons in a substantive way. The con-
cern for equality has allowed the Supreme Court to give great defer-
1 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (searches not conducted pursuant to a search warrant are per se
unreasonable.).
2 See, e.g., United States v Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
s See, e.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
4 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) discussed
infra note 177 and accompanying text. See, also, National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) discussed infra note 197 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990) discussed
infra note 216 and accompanying text.
6 For a general discussion of recent developments in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (2d ed. 1987).
7 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 411 (1974). Professor Mertens refers to these functions as "interest balancing"
and "discretion control." William J. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of
Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 552-53 (1984).
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ence to police and agency rules in determining the scope of
protection offered by the Fourth Amendment. The emphasis on
equality of treatment has turned the Court's attention away from the
issues of privacy to the issues of procedural regularity of police and
agency practices.
At first, the Court's emphasis on equality of treatment of
searched persons, as guaranteed through police rules, was actually a
step forward by the Rehnquist Court in the protection of civil liber-
ties.8 The emphasis on police rules in cases like Colorado v. Bertine9
can be seen as an attempt to restrict an officer's unfettered discre-
tion to search approved much earlier in United States v. Robinson.' 0
In one class of cases - the post-arrest search cases - the Supreme
Court's emphasis on equality of treatment has led to the substitu-
tion of police rules in place of a search warrant." The arrestjustifies
the search and the existence of police rules guards against arbitrari-
ness in enforcement. The search warrant is no longer necessary - its
purposes have been met through other means. It should not be sur-
prising that the warrant requirement has been supplanted in many
instances by police regulations. After all, there is every indication
that the application to the magistrate for the issuance of a search
warrant is often little more than a ritual.
12
However, in a number of recent cases in which a search was
preceded by neither an arrest nor by a warrant, the emphasis on
equality of treatment has gone beyond the issue of whether the
search was conducted in an arbitrary fashion. Equality of treatment
has been used in the drug testing cases and the sobriety checkpoint
cases as a weighty factor in determining whether an intrusion by the
State into the privacy of the individual was justified in the first place.
Equality of treatment, as guaranteed through police or agency rules,
has gone beyond being a substitute for the search warrant to protect
against arbitrariness and has now taken a place in the balancing
formula used to determine whether the search was justified. The
result has been to turn the Court's attention away from the issue of
privacy to the issue of the procedural regularity of police and agency
practices.
A constitutional approach toward searches and seizures which
8 See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
9 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
10 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
11 See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
12 See Stanley Ingber, Defending the Citadel: The Dangerous Attack of "Reasonable Good
Faith", 36 VAND. L. REV. 1511, 1576 (1983); Wayne R. LaFave and FrankJ. Remington,
Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63
MicH. L. REV. 987, 992-93 (1965).
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centers upon equality of treatment is not without its allure. It is
easier to judge a police practice by its uniformity of application than
by its conformity to a nebulous constitutional mandate regarding
privacy. In determining whether a search is "reasonable," a com-
parative judgment must be made as to that which is "unreasona-
ble." 13 It is common sense to conclude that a police practice which
varies from group to group is inherently suspect as "unreasonable,"
particularly if the variation in police practice is dependent on such
inherently suspect categories as race, age, sex, or sexual preference.
But the converse is not true; simply because a person has received
equal treatment does not necessarily mean that the search is reason-
able under traditional Fourth Amendment values.
In addition, the tendency to view the Fourth Amendment more
as a means of guaranteeing equal treatment than as a source of sub-
stantive privacy rights is given impetus by the role which the
Supreme Court has taken in the area of race relations in the 35 years
since Brown v. Board of Education.14 There is a certain seductiveness
in deciding cases on the grounds of equality, particularly when the
development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is seen in its his-
torical perspective. Enforcing equal rights is the business of the
Supreme Court. The development of current search and seizure
law, including such landmark cases as Mapp v. Ohio,15 occurred at a
time when the Supreme Court paid increasing attention to racial in-
equality in American society.16 In a society which brings a dispro-
portionate number of racial minorities into the criminal justice
system, 17 it was, and remains, impossible to decide constitutional
criminal procedure issues wholly devoid of race implications. The
growing tendency in Supreme Court decisions is to permit searches
if the searches invade equally the privacy interests of all those neces-
sarily affected.
13 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
14 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
15 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16 See, e.g., JOHN E. NOwAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA & J. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LAw 524 (3d ed. 1986).
17 In 1987, of 295,873 total inmates (excluding Federal and state prisons and other
correctional institutions; state-operated jails in Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode
Island, and Vermont, and other facilities that retain persons less than 48 hours), 124,267
were black, and 2,959 were other racial minorities. In 1988, blacks constituted 12.3 %
of the total population, and other racial minorities constituted 3.4 % of the population.
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990, p. 187, table 323; p. 12, table 11.
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Although one might speculate as to the reason for the ascen-
sion of equal application as a guiding principle in Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, in practice the justification of equal treatment
is an effective method of permitting the executive and legislative
branches to give content to the Fourth Amendment.18 An emphasis
on equality of treatment has permitted the Supreme Court to rely
upon police regulations and agency regulations to set the parame-
ters of constitutionally-acceptable searches. In the end, the empha-
sis on equal treatment cloaks expedient searches in a new guise of
acceptability. At a time when technological developments enable
new attacks upon individual privacy, 19 it makes no sense to neuter
the Fourth Amendment into a constitutional directive for equal
treatment.
Any attempt to weave a single-strand theory of search and
seizure law is doomed to failure. There is simply no dominant, uni-
fying principle in Supreme Court cases on the Fourth Amend-
ment.20 Yet, one can conclude that post-arrest searches which
minimize arbitrary application through police or agency rules will
face a warm reception in the Supreme Court when the search is
challenged on the ground of the failure to obtain a search warrant.
In other searches not preceded by an arrest, such as drug tests and
sobriety checkpoints, the existence of police or agency rules will be
used by the Supreme Court not only to protect a person against
arbitrary searches, but also to justify the searches themselves. In
these cases a search is justified if the State can make a credible case
18 See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Robert C. Power, Technology and the Fourth Amendment: A Proposed Formulation
for Visual Searches, 80J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1989).
20 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PiTr.
L. REV. 227 (1984); Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expecta-
tion of Privacy", 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289 (1981); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth
Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468 (1985); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment Today,
32 VILL. L. REV. 1061 (1987); Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect
World: On Drawing "Bright Lines"and "Good Faith", 43 U. Pirr. L. REV. 307 (1982); Arnold
H. Loewy, Protecting Citizens From Cops and Crooks: An Assessment of the Supreme Court's Inter-
pretation of the Fourth Amendment During the 1982 Term, 62 N.C.L. REv. 329 (1984); Arnold
H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment As A Device For Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1229 (1983); Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles From the Government
Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It Anyway, 25 AM. GRIM. L. REV. 669 (1988); William J.
Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 551
(1984); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment 1981 Sup. CT. REV. 49; Ste-
phen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law - Abiding Public, 1989 Sup.
CT. REV. 87; Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth Amendment
Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583 (1989); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment In the
Balance: Accurately Setting The Scales Through The Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1173 (1988); Silas J. Wasserstrom and Louis M. Seidman, The Fourth
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19 (1988).
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for a significant social problem which can be mitigated by a limited
search, and the agency has adopted guidelines which attempt to en-
sure that all persons are treated equally.
2'
II. EQUALITY OF TREATMENT AS A SEARCH WARRANT SUBSTITUTE
In Johnson v. United States,22 the Supreme Court held that all
searches not conducted pursuant to a search warrant were per se un-
reasonable.23 Over time, so many exceptions have been grafted
onto the per se rule that the exceptions have virtually swallowed the
rule.24 In fact, many current exceptions to the per se rule are now
exceptions grafted onto exceptions. These second generation ex-
ceptions, such as inventory searches 25 and searches of containers,
26
have often moved well beyond the original justifications announced
by the Court for dispensing with the warrant requirement. As the
Supreme Court cases have strayed farther and farther from the ini-
tial rationale for the per se rule of Johnson, the Court has become
increasingly concerned with the issue of equal treatment of searched
persons. The Court's initial emphasis on the need for regularized
procedures in certain post-arrest searches was actually a movement
toward some greater degree of protection of individual liberties.
27
In fact, the trend could be expanded from its current role in inven-
tory and container cases to a broader range of searches subsequent
to an arrest. In the post-arrest cases, concerns for equality of treat-
ment as evidenced through an emphasis on police regulations are
directed to the issue of the arbitrariness of the search. In recent
cases, equality of treatment has entered the equation to justify the
search. Ultimately, however, it is becoming clear that equality-based
analysis will limit court protection of individual privacy concerns.
A. THE EARLY CASES
The Supreme Court has continually acknowledged that all
searches need not be made pursuant to a warrant. However, it was
not until Johnson v. United States28 that the Supreme Court estab-
lished current Fourth Amendment methodology by holding that a
"magistrate's warrant for a search may be dispensed with" only in
21 See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
22 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
23 Id. at 14.
24 See LAFAVE, supra note 6, at 118.
25 See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
26 See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
27 See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
28 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
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exceptional circumstances. 29 According to the Court in Johnson, one
may not justify the failure to obtain a search warrant simply because
of "the inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay neces-
sary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate." 30
Exceptions to the warrant requirement can be justified if the "sus-
pect was fleeing or likely to take flight," 3 1 if the search was of a mov-
able vehicle, 32 or if "evidence or contraband was threatened with
removal or destruction. .... .33
The justification for Johnson is the protection of a person's pri-
vacy. Judgments as to the propriety of a search must be made, when
practicable, by a "neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." '34 As Professor Amsterdam has commented,
indiscriminate searches are prohibited by Johnson either because
"they expose people and their possessions to interferences by gov-
ernment when there is no good reason to do so"' 35 or because "in-
discriminate searches and seizures are conducted at the discretion
of executive officials, who may act despotically and capri-
ciously .. "36 The fear expressed in Johnson is that warrantless
searches are suspect because they may be unjustified and because
they may also be arbitrary.
Early cases applyingJohnson did not center on the "arbitrary im-
pact" prong of the Johnson rationale of the Fourth Amendment.
Rather, they limited their discussion to the "unjustified - intrusion"
prong. In Chimel v. California,37 the Court did not face the arbitrari-
ness issue since the Court found that the search was not conducted
pursuant to a search warrant and was therefore unreasonable and
unjustified. 38 In United States v. Robinson,39 the seeds of Fourth
Amendment inconsistency were sown both as to the issue ofjustifi-
able intrusions as well as to the issue of arbitrary impact. It was not
until more than a decade after Robinson that the Supreme Court be-
gan to address the dangers of unequal treatment that it had created
in Robinson.





34 Id. at 14.
35 Amsterdam, supra note 7, at 411.
36 Id.
37 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
38 Id. at 768.
39 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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In Chimel v. California,40 police officers searched an entire house
while arresting Chimel in his home on a burglary charge. 41 The
Supreme Court, in overturning Chimel's conviction, limited the
scope of the warrantless search incident to an arrest to the area from
which the person arrested might obtain weapons or evidentiary
items. 42 The main thrust of the Court's opinion in Chimel centered
on the unjustified nature of the search.43 The dissenting opinion
argued that no search warrant should be required to search
Chimel's house once he had been arrested since the additional inva-
sion was relatively minor.44 In response, the Court stated:
We cannot join in characterizing the invasion of privacy that results
from a top-to-bottom search of a man's house as minor. And we can
see no reason why, simply because some interference with an individ-
ual's privacy and freedom of movement has lawfully taken place, fur-
ther intrusions should automatically be allowed despite the absence of
a warrant that the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require. 45
Of lesser concern to the Court was the arbitrariness which
might result if a search of the entire house were approved. The
Court feared that "by the simple expedient of arranging to arrest
suspects at home rather than elsewhere," law enforcement agents
would have the opportunity to engage in searches not justified by
probable cause.46 Putting aside the likelihood that the arrest of the
defendant would give rise to probable cause to search his home, the
Court's protection of Chimel's privacy interest in his home pre-
cluded the warrantless search. As a result, the Court did not face
the concern that the right to search might be arbitrarily used or used
pursuant to unacceptable criteria.
In dissent, Justice White would have permitted the warrantless
search.47 However, nowhere in his dissent is the issue of arbitrary
enforcement addressed. Justice White gave no indication in his dis-
sent that the police search was in any way dependent upon the exist-
ence of guidelines affecting the manner and scope of the search.
Nor can one find in the dissent the substitution of police rules for
the search warrant - a position similar to that adopted by the Court
in an analogous automobile search some thirteen years later in
40 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
41 Id. at 753-54.
42 Id. at 763.
43 Id. at 767-68.
44 Id. at 782 (White, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 766-67 n.12.
46 Id. at 767.
47 Id. at 781.
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United States v. Ross.48 Had the Supreme Court not centered its dis-
cussion on the privacy interest of Chimel, but had instead focused
its attention upon whether all defendants and their homes would be
searched in a similar manner, the Court could have created a bright-
line rule allowing the total search in a manner similar to that in
which it subsequently justified the search in Ross. In light of Ross
and subsequent cases like Colorado v. Bertine49 and Florida v. Wells,-5
one must question whether searches in Chimel situations will be ap-
proved in the future if the search is conducted pursuant to police
rules which limit the discretion of the arresting officer. It is conceiv-
able that in future Chimel situations the Supreme Court may allow a
full, warrantless search of the house if there is probable cause to
arrest and if the potential arbitrariness of the search is constrained
by police rules. Of course, such a change in the law would alter
decisions such as Payton v New York 51 and Steagald v. United States.
5 2
However, in the Chimel decision the Court centered its attention on
the privacy interest of Chimel, insisting that the equal treatment of
Chimel would apparently remain part of the responsibility of the
magistrate who would issue the search warrant prior to the search of
the house.
It was in United States v. Robinson,53 decided four and one-half
years after Chimel (and after four newJustices had been appointed to
the Court), that the stage was set for the subsequent shift of the
Supreme Court's attention to equality of treatment in search cases.
In Robinson, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction of the defend-
ant based upon a warrantless search in which the police discovered
heroin.54 Robinson was arrested while in his car for driving without
a license. 55 Pursuant to police regulations, the police conducted a
full-custody search 56 which revealed the heroin. Although in Robin-
son a case can be made that arbitrary enforcement of the right to
search was limited by the District of Columbia police rules, the
Court centered its attention only on the concern of intrusiveness.
The Court asserted that: "A custodial arrest of a suspect based on
48 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
49 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
50 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990).
51 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Payton, the Court held that an arrest warrant is required
before the police may enter a suspect's home to make an arrest.
52 451 U.S. 204 (1981). In Steagald, the Court held that a search warrant is required
before the police may look for a suspect in the home of a third party.
53 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
54 Id. at 236-37.
55 Id. at 220-21.
56 Id. at 221-23 n.2.
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probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amend-
ment."' 57 In upholding the search, the Co urtjustified the absence of
a warrant on the twin bases of the need to preserve evidence and the
need to disarm the arrestee. 58 The Court drew a brightline rule for
all arrests and for all crimes. The Court refused to allow a case-by-
case adjudication as to "whether or not there was present one of the
reasons supporting the authority for a search. . .. "59
The circumstances in Robinson suggest that Robinson was
treated differently than the majority of traffic offenders.60 Indeed, it
is unlikely that all traffic offenders in the District of Columbia were
fully searched by police officers. The police knew Robinson and
were alerted to the risk that he was currently involved in criminal
conduct. The District of Columbia police procedures apparently
did limit the discretion of the arresting officer;6' yet, the Court con-
cluded that "[s]uch operating procedures are not, of course, deter-
minative of the constitutional issues presented by this case." 62 In
Gustafson v. Florida,63 a companion case to Robinson, the Court held
that it was not constitutionally significant that in Gustafson police reg-
ulations did not require that the defendant be taken into custody.
64
The Court's concern in Robinson and Gustafson focused on the lack of
additional intrusiveness of a search conducted after an arrest de-
spite the fact that the risk of arbitrary enforcement was very high. In
fact, the dissent in Robinson was more interested in the further intru-
siveness in the full-custody search even though the dissent did not
ignore the risk of arbitrariness. 65 Objections to Robinson and Gustaf-
son centered primarily on the failure of the Court to recognize the
temptation to accept arbitrariness. 66 The result in Robinson was, for
all practical purposes, to eliminate protection from arbitrary en-
forcement from under the purview of the Fourth Amendment in
post-arrest cases. The cases after Robinson look to the arrest to jus-
57 Id. at 235. See also id. at 237, in which Justice Powell in a concurring opinion
noted, "I believe that an individual lawfully subjected to a custodial arrest retains no
significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person...
58 Id. at 234.
59 Id. at 235.
60 See id. at 221 n.l.
61 Id. at 221-23 n.1, 2.
62 Id. at 223 n.2.
63 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
64 Id. at 265.
65 Id. at 259 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "I, for one, cannot characterize any of these
intrusions into the privacy of an individual's papers and effects as being negligible inci-
dents to the more serious intrusion into the individual's privacy stemming from the
arrest itself."
66 See, e.g., LAFAvw, supra note 6, at § 5.2(b).
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tify the search and look to police rules to guard against arbitrariness
in conducting the search.
B. THE SECOND GENERATION CASES
The next generation of exceptions to the per se rule of Johnson
drift away from the Chimel and Robinson justification of police protec-
tion and evidence preservation for waiving the warrant requirement.
Instead, the cases most often uphold police conduct by reasoning
that all searched persons will be treated equally. In these cases, the
reliance on the equality-of-treatment rationale, as guaranteed
through police agency rules, first appears. The search-incident-to-
an-arrest cases, 67 the automobile cases, 68 the closed container
cases, 69 and the inventory search cases 70 are good examples of these
second generation cases, which begin to move toward a justification
for the warrantless search based on the equal application of the
agency rules authorizing the search. At the same time, these cases
minimize the privacy interests of the defendants. Here, police rules
are sometimes used as a substitute for the warrant process. Privacy
interests are minimized on the basis that the greater intrusion (the
arrest) takes the lesser intrusion (the search subsequent to the
arrest) out from under the per se rule.
1. Automobile and Inventory Cases
The history of the automobile exception to the per se rule has its
origin in the prohibition case of Carroll v. United States.7 1 The ration-
ale in Carroll, which stressed the movable nature of the automo-
bile, 72 eventually gave way to the warrantless search of the
automobile even after the automobile had been immobilized. In
Chambers v. Maroney,73 the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless
search of an automobile at the police station sometime after the oc-
cupants of the automobile had been arrested. 74 In the cases which
followed Chambers,75 the Supreme Court has readily allowed a war-
67 See supra section II.A.
68 See infra section II.B. 1.
69 See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
70 See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
71 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
72 Id. at 153.
73 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
74 Id. at 43.
75 The Court took a slight detour in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
In Coolidge, as Professor Saltzburg notes, "[a] plurality held Carroll to be inapplicable
here, because of the absence of exigency. This is the first and last Supreme Court case
where a warrantless automobile search was held to be unconstitutional for that reason."
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 233 (3d ed. 1988).
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rantless search at the police station if the automobile search could
have been made immediately after the arrest on the street.76 As
Professor LaFave notes,77 since the exigency rationale of movability
often was not apparent in searches which the Supreme Court was
willing to uphold, the Court in Cady v. Dombroski,78 Cardwell v.
Lewis,79 and South Dakota v. Oppermans8 began to emphasize the di-
minished expectation of privacy which surrounds the automobile.
The degree of criticism from commentators which the diminished
expectation rationale created8 l did not deter the Court in using its
handy justification.
The often unstated assumption in the automobile cases is that a
brightline rule sets the stage for equal treatment of all arrestees.
Although the language used to justify the warrantless search varies
from case to case and Justice to Justice, a distinct theme emerges in
the post-arrest search cases. In the words ofJustice Blackmun from
his dissent in Chadwick: "As the Court in Robinson recognized, cus-
todial arrest is such a serious deprivation that various lesser inva-
sions of privacy may be fairly regarded as incidental. '8 2
The approach which allows warrantless searches of automobiles
and of the containers83 therein, does so on two bases. First, the re-
sulting search does not offend a legitimate privacy right since the
arrest is the greater intrusion; and second, the search is not arbitrary
as it comes after a determination that there is probable cause to
arrest. The Court never explicitly admits that it has little faith in the
warrant process. However, the Court strongly implies that there are
no significant privacy interests of the arrestee remaining that will
justify the inconvenience of interjecting a magistrate into the pro-
cess. If the subsequent search is seen as a minimal intrusion once
the arrest has been made, the Court, in order to make the magis-
76 See, e.g., Florida v. Myers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798
(1982).
77 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 3 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7.2(b) (2d ed.1987).
78 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
79 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
80 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
81 See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the Warrant
Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 569-72 (1982); Vivian D. Wilson, The Warrantless Auto-
mobile Search: Expectations Without Justification, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (1980). See LAFAvE
supra note 6, at 457-61.
82 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 20 (1977) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
83 The term "container cases" is used to describe those cases in which the Court has
wrestled with the issue of whether an individual has a higher expectation of privacy in a
closed container within an automobile than the individual has generally within the inte-




trate's role a meaningful one, would have been required to overturn
such cases as United States v. Watson 84 and require arrest warrants
issued by a magistrate whenever possible. The concern soon shifts
in the automobile cases and container cases from the Fourth
Amendment privacy interest to a question of whether the authority
of the police to search all arrestees, their automobiles, and their
closed containers has been unequally exercised.
The Court's emphasis on equality of treatment in search cases
took a giant leap forward in the inventory case of South Dakota v.
Opperman.8 5 Opperman's car was inventoried prior to his arrest "us-
ing a standard inventory form pursuant to standard police proce-
dures." 86 The Court held that its decisions pointed unmistakably to
the conclusion reached by both federal and state courts that inven-
tories pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable.8 7
The Court noted that the "police did not breach a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy because such an expectancy with respect to one's
automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or
office." 88 In addition, the Court did not require the police to have a
search warrant because the search was "carried out in accordance
with standard procedures in the local police department,"8 9 and
therefore the likelihood of unequal and arbitrary enforcement was
significantly reduced. The Court pointed out that "there is no sug-
gestion whatever that this standard procedure, essentially like that
followed throughout the country, was a pretext concealing an inves-
tigating police motive." 90 A police officer testified that all im-
pounded vehicles were searched, noting that: "[An] officer does not
make a discretionary determination to search based on a judgment
that certain conditions are present. Inventory searches are con-
ducted in accordance with established police department rules or
policies and occur whenever an automobile is seized." 91
The emphasis upon equality of treatment through the opera-
tion of police rules by the majority and concurring Justices in Opper-
man caused Justice Marshall in dissent to remark that the Court's
decision seems to require a "routine search of nearly every car im-
84 423 U.S. 411 (1976). In Watson the Court refused to require that the police obtain
an arrest warrant whenever practicable. The Court stated a preference for arrest war-
rants but refused to require that an arrest warrant be issued prior to a routine arrest.
85 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
86 Id. at 366.
87 Id. at 372.
88 Id. at 367.
89 Id. at 375 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 443 (1973)).
90 Id. at 376.
91 Id. at 383 (Powell, J., concurring).
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pounded." 92 In subsequent cases, the Court was quick to point out
the existence of departmental policies governing inventory searches
of impounded vehicles as ajustification for the warrantless search.93
2. Searches Incident to An Arrest and Searches of Containers
The reliance in Opperman upon the existence of police rules lim-
iting discretion in the inventory cases was not emphasized in the
early cases involving the proper scope of searches incident to an
arrest. In New York v. Belton,9 4 the Supreme Court confronted the
issue of the "proper scope of a search of the interior of an automo-
bile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants." 95 After
Belton and his companions had exited their car and had been
searched, a state police officer searched the passenger compartment
of the car and found Belton's leather jacket.96 The , police officer
unzipped one of the jacket pockets and discovered cocaine. 97 Under
the rubric of creating a brightline rule for police officers to follow,
the Court concluded: [W]hen a policeman has made a lawful custo-
dial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contempo-
raneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment
of that automobile... [and] may also examine the contents of any
container found within the passenger compartment.9 8
The Court justified its brightline test as one created as a by-
product of the exclusionary rule and the need to create "a set of
rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct
determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is
justified in the interest of law enforcement." 99
Yet, it is not clear why the Court in Belton chose the particular
bright-line rule of permitting the search of everything within the
passenger compartment. Clearly, the Court could have announced
a rule that permitted no search of the contents of the automobile
once the parties were outside the automobile. The car could be sub-
sequently impounded and searched pursuant to police procedure
required in Opperman. Another approach following the Court's lead
in Opperman would have been to require a search of the automobile
pursuant to police regulations. If it is true that police need a "famil-
92 Id. at 392 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93 See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987).
94 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
95 Id. at 459.
96 Id. at 456.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 460.
99 Id. at 458 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized
Procedures" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 142).
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iar standard" because they are unable to quickly "reflect on and bal-
ance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront,"' 100 it does not necessarily follow that
the particulars of the rule are best created by the Court. The arrest
of the driver or a passenger in a car allows the Court to justify the
waiver of the per se rule. The intrusion associated with the arrest
subsumes the intrusion associated with the subsequent search.
There is no additional protection, as the warrant relates to probable
cause, to be gained by requiring the magistrate to authorize the
search of the automobile. Yet, the warrant is also used to protect
against arbitrariness. This is the same arbitrariness issue found in
Johnson and Opperman: not every car which is stopped will be
searched fully. If the Court in Opperman thought that police proce-
dures would restrict the dangers of arbitrary enforcement of inven-
tory searches, it is difficult to understand why that same concern was
not evident in Belton. The search in Belton was merely a form of an
inventory search conducted on the street immediately after the
arrest.
An approach similar to that taken by the Court in Belton ap-
peared a year later in the container case of United States v. Ross.10 1 In
Ross, the defendant was arrested for possession of heroin. A search
of the trunk of Ross's car at the scene of the arrest revealed a brown
paper bag which contained glassine bags of heroin. A more thor-
ough search of the automobile at the police station revealed a zip-
pered pouch containing cash.102 A three judge panel of the District
Court determined that Ross had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the pouch but not in the paper bag.'0 3 The pouch could only be
searched pursuant to a warrant. 0 4 The Circuit Court en banc re-
jected a constitutional distinction based upon the type of
container. 05 The court held that "[t]he Fourth Amendment pro-
tects all persons, not just those with the resources or fastidiousness
to place their effects in containers that decision-makers would rank
in the luggage line."' 1 6 With this nod toward equality of applica-
tion, the court held that the police could not search either container
without a search warrant.' 0 7
In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court rejected
100 Id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)).
101 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
102 Id. at 801.
103 Id. at 801-02.
104 Id. at 802.
105 Id.
106 Id. (quoting United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1161 (1981)).
107 Id. at 803.
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its earlier decision in Robbins v. California 10s and portions of its opin-
ion in Arkansas v. Sanders,10 9 and allowed the warrantless "search of
every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object
of the search.""10
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens rejected any constitu-
tional distinction based upon "worthy" versus "unworthy" contain-
ers. Justice Stevens asserted that:
For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled
to the same guarantees of privacy as the most majestic mansion, so
also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of
clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal
his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive
with the locked attache case. 1
Once more, the Court approved a warrantless search, however this
time the Court openly admitted that some degree of equality of ap-
plication was at the core of its concern. 12 Yet, the impact of Ross is
not to protect rich and poor alike, but rather to expose the posses-
sions of the rich and poor equally, and without cause, to the eyes of
the King's henchmen.
The Ross decision mirrors Belton from the standpoint that the
Court saw a need to create a rule to give clear guidance to police.
31 3
The result in Belton was to excuse the necessity to have the search
guided by a warrant. The Court in Ross pointed out that "[t]he
scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no nar-
rower - and no broader - than the scope of a search authorized by
a warrant supported by the probable cause."'1 4 The odd part of the
Ross decision comes from the Court's emphasis on the equality,
before the law, of rich person's and poor person's possessions."15
Yet, no attempt is made to face the practical realization that all parts
of all automobiles of all arrestees will not be searched. Since no
warrant is necessary, no magistrate will guard against arbitrary en-
forcement. And in Ross, as in Belton, the Court made no attempt to
limit arbitrary enforcement through the mechanism of police rules.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall complained that the majority of
the Court had taken "a first step toward an unprecedented 'prob-
108 Id. at 824.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 825.
111 Id. at 822.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 803-04. See also id. at 826 (Powell, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 823.
115 Id. at 822.
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able cause' exception to the warrant requirement." ' 16 The search of
the containers within the automobile were "inconsistent with those
established Fourth Amendment principles concerning the scope of
the automobile exception and the importance of the warrant re-
quirement."1 17 The fact that the new rule in Ross would effect all
persons without regard to status did not impress Justice Marshall,
who argued that "[t]he Court derives satisfaction from the fact that
its rule does not exalt the rights of the wealthy over the rights of the
poor. A rule so broad that all citizens lose vital Fourth Amendment
protection is no cause for celebration."' 18 But even Justice Marshall
does not center upon a compromise position suggested by the
Court in Opperman: the excusing of the warrant requirement if the
danger of arbitrary enforcement was limited by the existence of po-
lice rules governing the post-arrest search." 19
C. RECENT CASES
The emphasis on equal treatment has become even more prom-
inent as the Supreme Court has broadened its exceptions to the per
se rule of Johnson. In Illinois v. Lafayette,120 the defendant was ar-
rested for disturbing the peace after an altercation with a theater
manager. 21 Lafayette carried a shoulder-bag which the police took
from him during the booking process.1 22 They then inventoried the
contents of the shoulder bag.1 23 Within the bag, the officer found
amphetamine pills. 124
The Supreme Court upheld the search, holding that "it is not
'unreasonable' for police, as part of the routine procedure incident
to incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or arti-
cle in his possession, in accordance with established inventory pro-
cedures."' 125 The Court extended the analysis it had begun in South
Dakota v. Opperman.t26 The justification for the inventory search
does not rest on probable cause, and therefore a warrant is not a
requirement. 27 The inventory search is merely "an incidental ad-
116 Id. at 828 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 831 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 842-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
119 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976).
120 462 U.S. 640, 641 (1983).
121 Id. at 641.
122 Id. at 641-42.
123 Id. at 642.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 648.
126 Id. at 647.
127 Id. at 643.
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ministrative step following arrest and preceding incarceration."' 128
The Court pointed out that "[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which
establishes the authority to search."' 29 The Court stressed the need
for standardized procedures but concluded that it would not use the
procedures as the basis for a " 'less intrusive' means" test. i3 0 The
Court concluded that it was not its "function to write a manual on
administering routine, neutral procedures of the station house."' 3 1
The emphasis on "neutral procedures" implied the need to guaran-
tee that police treated arrestees with equality. Equality of treatment
is assured if there is a "station-house search of every item carried on
or by a person who has been lawfully taken into custody by the
police." 3
2
Two cases following on the heels of Lafayette, Colorado v. Ber-
tine133 and Florida v. Wells, 134 continued the Court's Prouse-Lafayette
methodology. The Court's attention in Bertine and Wells began to
stray from the privacy interests of the arrestee and moved toward an
examination of whether the search process significantly guaranteed
that police would treat all arrestees equally. It is in these closed-
container cases that the Supreme Court's emphasis on equal treat-
ment became its paramount concern.
In Bertine, the defendant was arrested for driving while under
the influence of alcohol.' 3 5 After Bertine was in custody, but before
the police impounded his van, an officer inventoried the contents of
Bertine's van in accordance with local police procedures.' 3 6 In a
closed backpack, the officer found drugs, cash, and drug parapher-
nalia. 13 7 The Court held that the inventory exception to the per se
rule, particularly as applied in South Dakota v. Opperman and Illinois
v.Lafayette, justified the warrantless search of the van and the con-
tents of the backpack. 138 In so deciding, the Supreme Court dis-
agreed with the Colorado Supreme Court decision which held that
the search was unreasonable because there were no exigencies to
justify the warrantless search. 139 The police towed Bertine's van to
a "secure, lighted facility," and Bertine "could have been offered
128 Id. at 644.
129 Id. at 645 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
130 Id. at 647.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 648.
133 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
134 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990).
135 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 368.
136 Id. at 368-69.
137 Id. at 369.
138 Id. at 374-75.
139 People v. Bertine, 706 P.2d 411, 418 (Colo. 1985).
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the opportunity to make other arrangements for safekeeping of his
property."1 40 But, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
"[r]easonable police regulations relating to inventory procedures
administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even
though the courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise
equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure."''
4 1
In Bertine, however, the Supreme Court met the first challenge
to its dependence upon equal treatment in order to justify a war-
rantless search. Bertine argued "that the inventory search of his van
was unconstitutional because departmental regulations gave the po-
lice officers discretion to choose between impounding his van and
parking and locking it in a public parking place."1 42 In rejecting this
argument, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for majority, concluded:
Nothing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits the exercise of police dis-
cretion so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence
of criminal activity. Here, the discretion afforded the Boulder police
was exercised in light of standardized criteria, related to the feasibility
and appropriations of parking and locking a vehicle rather than im-
pounding it.'1
3
There was no showing that the police "chose to impound Bertine's
van in order to investigate suspected criminal activity."1 4
4
The Court in Bertine had effectively shifted its inquiry away from
the approach in Johnson, which relied upon probable cause and a
search warrant to protect against unjustified and arbitrary intrusions
by the State. After Bertine, searches are justified if conducted subse-
quent to the greater intrusion of an arrest. Arbitrariness is staved
off by the existence of reasonable police regulations administered in
good faith. 145 The emphasis by the majority and the concurringJus-
tices was on regulated discretion to deter police and to insure "that
inventory searches will not be used as a purposeful and general
means of discovering evidence of crime." 146 The reasonableness of
the inventory search for Fourth Amendment purposes depended
upon the lawfulness of the original arrest and the existence of dis-
cretion-limiting police regulations.
140 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 373.
141 Id. at 374. For a discussion of the least intrusive alternative analysis, see Strossen
supra note 20.
142 Bertine, 479 U.S. at 375.
143 Id. at 375-76.
144 Id. at 376.
145 See id. at 374.
146 Id. at 376 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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The concurring opinion147 and the dissenting opinion1 48
framed the question beginning to be posed in Bertine as: How much
discretion in determining the scope of an inventory search will cause
the Court to strike down the search on the basis of arbitrariness of
enforcement?
The concurring opinion of Justices Blackmum, joined by Jus-
tices Powell and O'Connor, reads as if the Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence had always considered the preeminent issue to be
associated with the manner in which a search was conducted as op-
posed to whether the search unreasonably interfered with the per-
son's reasonable privacy interest. 149 The concurring opinion leads
one to believe that the authority to restrict searches has always been
delegated to the police to determine reasonableness through pro-
mulgation of internal rules. As Justice Blackmum wrote for the
three-justice concurrence:
I join the Court's opinion, but write separately to underscore the im-
portance of having such inventories conducted only pursuant to stan-
dardized policy procedures. The underlying rationale for allowing an
inventory exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant rule is that po-
lice officers are not vested with discretion to determine the scope of
the inventory search .... The absence of discretion ensures that inven-
tory searches will not be used as a purposeful and general means of
discovering evidence of crime. Thus, it is permissible for police of-
ficers to open closed containers in an inventory search only if they are
following standard police procedures that mandate the opening of
such containers in every impounded vehicle.' 50
If Justice Jackson, the author of the Court's opinion in Johnson,
were to read the Bertine opinion, he would be startled to discover
that the reasonableness of a search is no longer determined on a
case-by-case basis by a magistrate. A search is now reasonable when
a case-by-case analysis is forbidden. Police regulations are deemed
a more effective method of eliminating arbitrariness in searches
than the search warrant.
In dissents, Justices Marshall and Brennan disagreed with the
Court's method of determining reasonableness and refused to join
in what they considered to be the total abandonment of the warrant
requirement in the area of automobile searches.' 5 ' The justifica-
tions for permitting warrantless inventory searches were not appli-
cable to Bertine, especially since the police took much of the
147 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
148 Id. at 378 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 376-77 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
150 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
151 Id. at 387 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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damning evidence from a backpack. Justice Marshall noted that:
"Whatever his [Bertine's] expectation of privacy in his automobile
generally, our prior decisions clearly established that he retained a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack and its con-
tents.'152 But even if one were to agree with the majority and con-
curring opinions that the "inventory searches are reasonable only if
conducted according to standardized procedures,"' 153 there were
"no standardized criteria [to] limit a Boulder police officer's discre-
tion."' 154 For Justice Marshall, "[s]tandardless and unconstrained
discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases
it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circum-
scribed, at least to some extent."' 155 Even if one accepted the analyt-
ical framework of the majority, Justice Marshall concluded: "By
allowing the police unfettered discretion, Boulder's discretionary
scheme, like the random spot checks in Delaware v. Prouse, is unrea-
sonable because of the 'grave danger' of abuse of discretion.
156
After Bertine, one must conclude that the issue of reasonable-
ness of searches of the automobiles of arrestees will center almost
solely on the question of whether the search process significantly
guarantees that police will treat all arrestees equally.157 In Florida v.
Wells, 158 the Supreme Court validated this conclusion.
The police stopped Wells for speeding and subsequently ar-
rested him for driving under the influence of alcohol. 159 Wells' car
was impounded and an inventory search produced marijuana and a
locked suitcase in the trunk.160 The police opened the suitcase and
found it to contain a large amount of marijuana.
161
The record below contained no evidence that the Florida High-
way Patrol had a "policy on the opening of closed containers found
during inventory searches."' 162 Consequently, applying Coloradb v.
Bertine, the Florida Supreme Court held that the trial court had
erred in refusing to suppress the marijuana found in the suitcase.
163
The Florida Supreme Court centered upon the language of the con-
152 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 379 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 378 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979)).
156 Id. at 381 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662).
157 See Justice Marshall's rather lengthy criticism of the Boulder Police Department.
Id. at 378-83.
158 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990).




163 479 U.S. 367 (1986).
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curring opinion in Bertine, which had required the police to open
either all containers, or no containers, during an inventory
search.164
The majority of the United States Supreme Court rejected the
"all-or-nothing" approach ascribed to Bertine by the Florida
Supreme Court even though the Court eventually found the search
to be unconstitutional. 165 The purpose of the inventory search is to
produce an inventory.166 The police must be able to exercise some
latitude in determining which articles to search, but the inventory
search must not be turned into "a purposeful and general means of
discovering evidence of crime."16 7 The police officer may take the
nature of the search and the nature of the particular container into
consideration. The Court noted that:
Thus, while policies of opening all containers or of opening no con-
tainers are unquestionably permissible, it would be equally permissi-
ble, for example, to allow the opening of dosed containers whose
contents officers determine they are unable to ascertain from examin-
ing the containers' exteriors. The allowance of the exercise ofjudg-
ment based on concerns related to the purposes of an inventory search
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
168
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Florida Supreme
Court because the Florida Highway Patrol had no policy whatever as
to the opening of closed containers during an inventory search, and
"that absent such a policy, the instant search was not sufficiently
regulated to satisfy the Fourth Amendment."' 69 Since the United
States Supreme Court in Wells tacitly approved the opening of all
dosed containers, its reference to sufficient regulation of discretion
to satisfy the Fourth Amendment must refer to its fear of arbitrary
enforcement. In other words, since all closed-container inventory
searches are justified, the fear of the Supreme Court was a fear of
arbitrary and thus unequal enforcement.
The concurring opinions in Wells echo this sentiment. In his
concurrence, writing for himself and Justice Marshall, Justice Bren-
nan continued with his position that absent "consent or exigency,
police may not open a dosed container found during an inventory
search of an automobile."' 7 0 But if Bertine is to be followed, "open-
164 Id.
165 Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635.
166 Id.




170 Id. at 1638 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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ing a container constitutes such a great intrusion that the discretion
of the police to do so must be circumscribed sharply to guard
against abuse." 171 Inventory searches are reasonable "under the
Fourth Amendment only if done in accordance with standard proce-
dures that limit the discretion of the police."' 172 Justice Blackmun
wrote a separate concurrence pointing out the dangers of giving an
individual policeman discretion during an inventory search. Justice
Blackmun pointed out that: "The exercise of discretion by an indi-
vidual officer, especially when it cannot be measured against objec-
tive, standard criteria, creates the potential for abuse of Fourth
Amendment rights our earlier inventory-search cases were designed
to guard against."' 73 For Blackmun, as well as for the majority in
Wells, it is not the warrantless nature of the search that is problem-
atic. Rather, it is the danger of unequal treatment which causes
concern.
The development of the Fourth Amendment from Johnson to
Wells should not be seen necessarily as a continuing process moving
away from the protection of individual privacy rights. Once one ac-
cepts the philosophy behind Robinson, one may posit that Prouse, La-
fayette, Bertine, and Wells have actually centered upon a way to protect
against arbitrary enforcement through the requirement that certain
searches be conducted according to police regulations. It may even
be that police regulations are a more effective control over police
conduct than the warrant process, as practiced, could ever be. The
danger in relying upon the mechanism of police regulations to com-
bat arbitrariness, however, is that courts will allow police regula-
tions to be so broad as to be meaningless. 7 4 One need only read
the dissent in Bertine to bring this concern to the forefront. 175 Also,
if one determines the reasonableness of a search for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes by reference to the adequacy of police regulations,
the stage may also be set to refer to police regulations for the
proper remedy if the regulations are not followed. The exclusion-
ary rule may well be the next victim of the movement toward the
dependence of the Fourth Amendment upon police regulations.
1 6
171 Id.
172 Id. at 1637.
173 Id. at 1639 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
174 See, LAFAVE supra note 6, at 141. For an excellent discussion of the possible roles
of police rules in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see Alschuler supra note 20 at 227-
31.
175 479 U.S. 367, 378-83 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176 Already there is some indication that the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule will admit evidence seized unlawfully but under statutory authority. Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340 (1987).
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Even if one views the Court's emphasis on equality of treatment
as a guard against arbitrariness in the post-arrest cases, recent uses
of the equality justification to authorize searches in non-arrest cases
cause other grave concerns.
III. EQUALITY OF TREATMENT AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR
WARRANTLESS, SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has upheld searches of per-
sons to screen for drugs and to check for drunk drivers where no
probable cause existed and no search warrant issued. In permitting
both drug screening and sobriety checkpoints, the Court has ele-
vated its concerns regarding equality of treatment above the legiti-
mate expectations of privacy of its citizens. In the post-arrest cases
discussed earlier, the Court raised questions regarding equality of
application only after it determined that the search of the individual
was justified by individualized suspicion - the search was justified
because there was probable cause to arrest. The greater intrusion
of an arrest justified the lesser intrusion of a subsequent search. In
the drug screening and sobriety checkpoint cases, however, equality
of treatment is used tojustify the search and to guarantee that the
search is not conducted in an arbitrary manner. Equality of treat-
ment, which is generally related to concerns of arbitrariness, is no
justification for the initial breach of individuals' rights of privacy. It
is not enough to find that all persons will be treated equally by the
state in its denial of individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy.
A. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: DRUG TESTING
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 17 7 the Federal Rail-
road Administration (FRA) promulgated regulations requiring some
railroad employees to provide blood and urine samples if the em-
ployees were involved in any way in certain train accidents. 178 The
Supreme Court held that the "special needs" exceptiori constructed
by the Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 179 justified dispensing both with
the warrant requirement and the probable cause requirement of the
Fourth Amendment when" 'special needs,' beyond the normal need
for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause require-
ment impracticable." 18 0
177 489 U.S. 602 (1989). See Schulhofer supra note 20.
178 Id. at 606.
179 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
180 Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 619 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868 (1987), quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 325 (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
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The Court decided that the privacy interest of the employee in-
vaded through urine testing was minimal.181 In addition, the Court
held that the two countervailing governmental interests in deterring
employees from using alcohol and drugs and in determining the
cause of a particular train accident 8 2 justified the FRA regulations
and therefore justified waiving the requirement of probable cause or
any notion of individualized suspicion. 18 3 Furthermore, individuals
have a limited expectation of privacy by "reason of their participa-
tion in an industry that is regulated pervasively, to ensure safety, a
goal dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness of cov-
ered employees."' 1 4 The need to preserve blood and urine samples
quickly after a train accident justifies waiving the warrant
requirement.1
85
Although the Court unequivocally held that the mandated tak-
ing of blood and urine samples were searches under the Fourth
Amendment, 186 the Court moved far away from the per se rule of
Johnson and used its "special needs" methodology adopted and im-
plemented in cases like T.L.O. v New Jersey.
187
The Court in Railway Labor Executives Ass'n reminded us that
generally the warrant requirement serves the dual role of guarantee-
ing that the intrusion is justified and that the search is not the ran-
dom or arbitrary act of government agents.188 As to the justification
for the search, the Court allowed the agency regulations both to
limit the reasonable privacy expectation of the employee so that
probable cause was not required and to do so without the necessity
of a warrant. 189 Railroad employees have a limited expectation of
privacy precisely because the railroad is conducting a highly-regu-
lated activity. 190 The Court concluded that an employee cannot
have a reasonable expectation of privacy precisely because the em-
ployee knew at the time of employment that the agency had deter-
mined, through its regulations, that employees have limited on-the-
job privacy interests. 19 1 As to the protection against the arbitrari-
181 Id. at 624.
182 Id. at 630.
183 Id. at 624.
184 Id. at 627.
185 Id. at 631.
186 Id. at 616.
187 Id. at 618. For a discussion of the "special needs analysis," see Maclin supra note
20 at 721.
188 Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 621-22.
189 Id. at 624.
190 Id. at 627.
191 Id. See Schulhofersupra note 20, at 135-36. The question not entirely addressed in
Railway Labor Executives Ass' is the question of the scope of the deference which the
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ness of an individual search, the Court was willing to excuse the
need for a search warrant and to rely in its place upon the agency's
regulations to protect against the "random or arbitrary acts of gov-
ernment agents."1 92 A warrant would "do little to further these
aims"1 93 under the facts of Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, "[indeed,
in light of the standardized nature of the tests and the minimal dis-
cretion vested in those charged with administering the program,
there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate."
1 94
The Court's reasoning has a seductive simplicity to it but it re-
lies upon the assumption that the content of an individual's reason-
able expectations of privacy should be greatly dependent upon the
reasonable expectations of privacy which regulators are willing to
concede. The Court's reasoning also requires a belief that equality
of treatment should play a major role in determining whether a
search is justified and therefore reasonable for Fourth Amendment
purposes. In the Court's own words, to require a warrant would do
little to assure any additional "certainty and regularity [over that]
already offered by the regulations, while significantly hindering, and
in many cases frustrating, the objectives of the Government's testing
program." 9 5
The Court's emphasis on equality does not go just to the issue
of the need for a warrant. It is also intended to influence the issue
of the reasonableness of the intrusion itself. Equality of treatment
as guaranteed through agency regulations is not intended just to
meet head-on the question of arbitrariness, but is also intended to
justify the search itself. The Court's "special needs" analysis en-
courages the agency to react to a social problem in a procedurally
fair way. If the social problem is great and the procedure fair, the
invasion of individual rights will then be seen as "minimal," particu-
larly when the agency has warned persons that they should not ex-
pect to be free from searches in certain situations. Although we
might well justify the search in Railway Labor Executives Ass'n on the
grounds that a warrant is impractical and the chaotic nature of a
serious train accident makes it practical only to test all on-site em-
ployees,19r the approach taken by the Court goes a long way toward
making the reasonableness determination of the Fourth Amend-
Court is willing to grant to the defining of "reasonable expectation of privacy" by an
agency through its regulations.
192 Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 621-22.
193 Id. at 622.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 624.
196 Id. at 631.
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ment turn on equality of application analysis. In doing so, the Court
has moved a long way toward making the content of the Fourth
Amendment dependent upon the content of the agency's regula-
tions. A decision handed down the same day as Railway Labor Execu-
tives Ass'n confirms this trend.
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,19 7 the Commis-
sioner of the United States Customs Service promulgated regula-
tions requiring an employee drug testing program for employees
directly involved in drug interdiction, for employees required to
carry a firearm, or for employees who handle classified materials.198
The Court held that Customs employees who interdict drugs or em-
ployees who carry firearms have a diminished expectation of privacy
regarding mandatory drug testing. 199 The agency's insistence on
drug testing, and therefore the interference with privacy rights, are
outweighed by the Government's "compelling interests in safe-
guarding our borders and the public safety .... -20
The Court once more used the "special needs" methodology
which it had applied in Railway Labor Executives Ass'n.20 1 The Court
concluded that because the testing program was "not designed to
serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement," 20 2 there is no need to
refer to the usual presumptions in favor of warrants to determine
the reasonableness of the search within the Fourth Amendment.203
The lesser privacy rights of employees, coupled with the Govern-
ment's need to deter drug use by its personnel, allowed the Court to
conclude that the drug test can be conducted without probable
cause or individualized suspicion, and without a search warrant. 20 4
Just as in Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, as long as there was a per-
ceived serious social problem and the agency had devised an appar-
ently fair process to implement its regulations, the Court was willing
to find only a minimal privacy intrusion. Again, it is clear that the
equality of treatment in the search situation impacted upon both the
initial justification for the search and the waiver of the warrant re-
quirement to guard against arbitrariness.
The Court, in negating the need for a search warrant, stressed
the awareness of employees of the existence of regulations mandat-
197 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
198 Id. at 660-61.
199 Id. at 672.
200 Id. at 677.
201 Id. at 665-66.
202 Id. at 666.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 666-72.
572 [Vol. 82
JUSTIFYING SEARCHES
ing drug screening. 20 5 Since the drug screening process is auto-
matic, an employee knows that whenever an employee seeks a
transfer to a covered position, the employee will be required to sub-
mit to a drug test. 206 The mandatory nature of the rules negate ar-
bitrariness and therefore no search warrant is needed since "there
are simply 'no special facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.' "207
For the Court, the same lack of discretion in the agency rules also
lowers employees' expectations of privacy and therefore serves to
justify the initial intrusion as well.
The Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to deter-
mine whether drug tests of all persons who apply for promotion to
positions where they would handle classified information was rea-
sonable. 208 The Court found the record on this issue to be inade-
quate,20 9 but in listing all persons apparently covered by this
"classified material" designation, (from Animal Caretaker to Bag-
gage Clerk) questions regarding arbitrariness were dearly in the
Court's mind.2
10
Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab emphasized the deference
which the majority was willing to give to the agency once it deter-
mined that all persons would be affected by the agency regulations
in an equal manner. For Justice Scalia, "[t]he Court's opinion ...
will be searched in vain for real evidence of a real problem that will
be solved by urine testing of Customs Service employees."' 21 Jus-
tice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens in dissent, placed less emphasis
on the role that equal treatment plays in the determination of rea-
sonableness. For Justice Scalia, the fact that the regulations would
require all employees to be treated equally is insufficient reason to
justify a drug program whose sole purpose is the symbolic condem-
nation of drug use.
21 2
In the drug-testing cases, the Supreme Court is willing to give
great discretion to government agencies to mandate drug testing if
the agency can marshal a credible justification for its program and
apply the program equally to all affected persons. The Court has
taken a similar course in upholding the constitutionality of the so-
205 Id. at 660-61.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 667 (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 383 (1976)) (Powell,
J., concurring).
208 Id. at 678.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212 Id. at 686-87.
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briety checkpoint in Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz. 2 1 3
B. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS
Roadblocks as means to detect drunk driving are searches
which potentially affect a large and broad sector of the citizenry.21 4
Other than choosing to drive in an area designated by police as an
area with a high incidence of drunk driving, the seized person has
done nothing to cause suspicion. In fact, the rationale for road-
blocks appears to be deterrence of future violations and not the de-
tection of current violators.
215
In Michigan Dep 't of State Police v. Sitz, 2 16 the Supreme Court held
that the Michigan roadblock practice was consistent with the Fourth
Amendment. 21 7 In Sitz, the sobriety checkpoint operation in ques-
tion lasted 1 1/4 hours.218 During that time, 126 vehicles were
stopped for an average time of 25 seconds per car.219 Two drivers
were "detained for field sobriety testing, and one of the two was
arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol." 220 The police
also arrested a third driver, who failed to stop at the roadblock, for
drunk driving. 221 They selected the checkpoints under guidelines
which also required that all vehicles passing through the checkpoint
would be stopped. The police briefly examined all drivers for signs
of intoxication.22
2
The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the checkpoints vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment. 223 Following the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Texas, 224 the Michigan court
balanced the state's interest in curbing drunk driving with the
court's conclusion that the roadblocks were generally ineffective and
that the stops were a substantial intrusion on individual liberties.
225
213 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
214 If one accepts Professor Loewy's premise that the primary purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to protect innocent persons from governmental intrusion, clearly the so-
briety checkpoint cases create the greatest danger to the Fourth Amendment. See Loewy
supra note 20, at 329-30.
215 See Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2498-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
216 Id. at 2481.
217 Id. at 2488.





223 Sitz v. Department of State Police, 170 Mich. App. 433, 429 N.W.2d 180, 182
(1988).
224 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
225 Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2484.
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The United States Supreme Court reversed the Michigan
court.2 26 The Court conceded that the stop was clearly a seizure
within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.227 After detailing the
seriousness of the drunken driving problem,228 the Court found the
intrusion on motorists to be minimal 229 and the likelihood that the
program was effective to be at an acceptable level. 230 The manner
in which the Supreme Court justified its conclusion that the intru-
sion was minimal is instructive. First, the Court noted that the intru-
sion was on an equal footing with roadblocks used to detect illegal
immigrants. 23 1 The Court pointed out that there is "virtually no dif-
ference between the levels of intrusion on law-abiding motorists
from the brief stops necessary to the effectuation of these two types
of checkpoints [sobriety checkpoints and illegal immigrant check-
points] which to the average motorist would seem identical save for
the nature of the questions the checkpoint officers might ask."
232
Since illegal immigrant checkpoints have been continually approved
by the Supreme Court, sobriety checkpoints are also constitutionally
permissible.23
3
The Supreme Court then turned to the issue of equality of ap-
plication to bolster its conclusion. The Supreme Court noted that
the "guidelines governing checkpoint operation minimize the dis-
cretion of the officers."' 23 4 The Court noted that "checkpoints are
selected pursuant to the guide lines, and uniformed police officers
stop every approaching vehicle." 23 5 The type of fear and surprise
condemned by the Court in United States v. Ortiz23 6 was no more
present in Sitz than was present in the illegal immigrant stops ap-
proved in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.23 7 The sobriety checkpoint
approved in Sitz was to be distinguished from the random stops con-
demned in Delaware v. Prouse238 as the "kind of standardless and un-
constrained discretion [which] is the evil the Court has discerned
226 Id. at 2483.
227 Id. at 2485.
228 Id. at 2485-86.
229 Id. at 2486.
230 Id. at 2487-88.
231 Id. at 2486.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 2486-87.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 2487.
236 422 U.S. 891 (1975). In Ortiz the Court refused to sanction searches at traffic
checkpoints removed from the border.
237 428 U.S. 543 (1976). In Martinez-Fuerte the Court approved warrantless stops at
fixed checkpoints in order to detect the transportation of illegal immigrants.
238 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Prouse the Court excluded evidence seized when a car was
stopped and searched without probable cause or even articulable suspicion. The state
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when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the offi-
cial in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent. '23 9
By any analysis, Sitz is a different case than Railway Labor Execu-
tives Ass'n or Van Raab, although at first blush the cases appear to
share many similarities. In all three cases, agency rules are intended
to negate the danger of arbitrariness. Again, in all three cases,
equality of treatment as guaranteed through agency rules goes be-
yond the issue of arbitrariness and spills over to a justification for
the search itself. Again, in all three cases, the Court's "real method-
ology" presents itself: given a serious social problem and agency
rules to enforce its detection policy in an even-handed manner, indi-
vidual privacy intrusion is deemed to be minimal.
Yet, as Justice Stevens points out in dissent, Sitz is a very differ-
ent case than either Railway Labor Executives Ass'n or Von Raab. In
Sitz, there is no notice to a relatively small group of individuals -
railroad workers and drug enforcement personnel - that they must
be prepared to have their privacy invaded on a limited number of
occasions. 240 In Sitz, the universe of persons whose privacy rights
are invaded is almost coterminous with the population as a whole.
In Railway Labor Executives Ass'n and in Von Raab, there is the intent
for the search to be "beyond the normal need for law enforcement."
In Sitz, state police operated the road block precisely to detect crimi-
nal behavior. But perhaps the most telling difference between Rail-
way Labor Executives Ass'n and Von Raab on the one hand and Sitz on
the other, is the amount of discretion (and therefore the risk of arbi-
trariness) which resides in Sitz to decide if, when, and where to search.
In Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, the triggering mechanism for the
search was an accident. If there is an accident and a person has cho-
sen to work on the railroad, there is a search. 241 In Von Raab, if a
person applies for a drug enforcement position or seeks a promo-
tion, there will be a search.242 Yet in Sitz, virtually the entire popula-
tion is at risk of arbitrary enforcement, and even the apparent
guidelines adopted by the Michigan Department of State Police can-
not remove that risk. If one suspects arbitrariness in operation, one
must also question the justification for the stop itself. If one be-
lieves that the search is justified not on the basis of individualized
suspicion but rather on a substantial risk of individual violations by
attempted to justify the stop as a random stop to check the driver's license and registra-
tion. Id. at 650.
239 Sitz, 110 S. Ct. at 2487 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661).
240 Id. at 2492 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 609 (1989).
242 National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1989).
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unknown persons, this belief is undermined if the search is in dan-
ger of being used as a pretext for other purposes.
One cannot read the Court's opinions in Railway Labor Executives
Ass'n and Von Raab without realizing the role which equality of appli-
cation plays in both justifying the initial search and in negating the
need for a search warrant. At the very least, the classes of searched
persons in these two cases are small in number and aware of the
potential invasion of their privacy interests. At least in Railway Labor
Executives Ass'n and Von Raab, distinct and limited events trigger the
searches. In these cases, it is simply wrong to justify a search on the
ground that similar persons are treated similarly. However, the ra-
tionale to justify the search in Sitz stands on even weaker grounds.
The class of searched persons in Sitz is broad and has no notice.
There is no unique triggering event which can be used at all to jus-
tify the search or guarantee against arbitrary enforcement. The
breadth of the class of searched persons also invites arbitrary
searches because of the breadth of the class itself. The Sitz decision
combines the worst features of arbitrariness in Robinson with the
worst features of justification in Railway Labor Executives Ass'n and
Von Raab.
In Sitz, the Court again uses its "real methodology" developed
in Railway Labor Executives Ass'n and Von Raab to uphold the constitu-
tionality of the sobriety checkpoint: if the State can make a credible
case for a significant social problem which can be tempered by a
limited type of search, the intrusion into the privacy rights of the
individual will be deemed to be minimal if the agency has adopted
guidelines which attempt to guarantee equal treatment of all per-
sons during the search.
III. CONCLUSION
As the Court places greater emphasis upon equality of treat-
ment as a factor in determining the reasonableness of a search, one
can predict that in some situations, the respect for individual privacy
interests will be enhanced. These situations include those such as
Bertine and Wells in which the arbitrariness invited by Robinson and
Belton is potentially stemmed by a requirement for police regulations
limiting discretion. The reality of privacy protection in these areas
will eventually depend upon whether the Supreme Court is willing
to review carefully, and with a cynical eye, the likelihood that the
police guidelines actually limit officer discretion. One can also pre-
dict that the Court's emphasis on equality of application will con-
tinue to denigrate privacy interests when equality of application is
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used to justify the initial intrusion. It simply is not enough to justify
a search on the basis that all searched persons will be treated
equally. The Fourth Amendment protects privacy. It does not sim-
ply guarantee procedural regularity.
